I suppose my reaction to this morning’s news conference on the arrests in London wasn’t entirely appropriate: repeated, explosive laughter. But how else does one respond to, “The lines will be long, expect massive delays, leave all your beverages and toothpaste behind. Oh, and enjoy your flight.” That last bit’s a quote.
It was also fascinating to listen to the rhetorical dancing as administration officials strove to say, without looking too foolish, “Unlike the guys we’ve been catching, the guys the Brits caught were actually dangerous. They were going to do something.”
So points to the British Empire for catching some genuine bad guys. Although it would be nice if their rhetoric weren’t quite up to overwrought American standards. A British official called the plot an act of “unimaginable mass murder”. Unless he has details I don’t (quite possible), we’re talking about a few planes blown out of the sky. That, unfortunately, is all too imaginable. If it were six planes, it might come close to the average civilian death toll in Iraq every two weeks.
The rest of my laughter was reserved for the all-too-predictable security theater that we’ll have to live through for a while. No liquids on planes, excepting baby food and medicine. Because as we all know, Gerber’s is blessed by Jesus and therefore can’t be used to hide anything nasty. Let’s all just acknowledge that someone in PR at DHS said, “I’ll be damned if some soccer mom is going to get on CNN, and claim that George Bush tried to starve her little Jimmy.”
And as for medicine… well, the whole point of this exercise is to keep liquid explosives off of planes, such as nitroglycerin. I can’t wait for someone to notice that nitroglycerin is medicine.
I will presume that you, like myself and nearly everyone else in the country except the stewards of DHS, once took ninth grade chemistry. If so, and you didn’t cut class that day, you know how to build a time-delayed chemical explosive. Take two precursors that explode when mixed, separate them with a neutral barrier for which at least one chemical is corrosive, and then wait until it’s eaten through. Should you wish to be sneaky, you can then package that in a suitably innocuous container, such as a hollowed out New Testament, large print King James edition. But that last step shouldn’t be necessary, since liquids are still allowed in checked baggage.
Point being that this is one of those weapons which, like nuclear weapons, we’re just vulnerable to and that’s all there is to it. The best defense is what they did in London: catching the bastards before they could do anything. The rigmarole that we’re currently going through at our airports will only catch that subset of miscreants who are smart enough to put the plan in motion, but stupid enough to not thwart a preflight screening.
More importantly, the rigmarole is designed to inconvenience American passengers just enough to reassure them that the government is doing something. You’d want to take the Heathrow approach — banning all carry-ons entirely — to really ensure that no one was bringing an explosive onboard. On the bright side, though, I guess it is nice to know that the alert system has a purpose when it’s not a presidential election year.
So let’s say you’re a hypothetical terrorist with a liquid explosive, somewhere on the US Eastern seaboard, and all of your compadres just got popped in London. Presumably you’re now in a “use it or lose it” situation, unless you’d rather be in a “run like hell” situation. Your options?
You could still board your plane. If I remember correctly, there are a number of methods by which you can take certain liquids and turn them into nefarious “solid” objects. Granted, though, that if you do that with nitroglycerin you make dynamite, which presumably even the TSA knows how to look for.
You could board your plane and check your explosive liquids as baggage. Of course, this would require that ninth grade chemistry knowledge, and it appears that the plans of the London crew were to mix up their chemicals aboard the plane. So those immediate plans would be thwarted — but again, it’s not hard to build that time delay chemical fuse. Biggest downside here for the enterprising terrorist is that the position of your explosive in relation to the fuel tanks and the fuselage is now, er, up in the air.
Or you could have listened to the same broadcast that I did this morning, which essentially said, “We’re going to go on double-secret probation red alert for all of our airports and planes. Trains? Business as usual.” And indeed, I’m writing this from Union Station in DC, which, aside from the usual rent-a-cops giving me the hairy eyeball, and the usual experience that every frickin’ train I want to board is delayed, is not under any kind of a lockdown. About the only difference I can see is that the trains are running more crowded since, surprisingly, lots of people don’t want to fly today. In the back of my mind, I can see Zacarias Moussouai and Michael Chertoff yelling at each other, “Wabbit season! Duck season! Wabbit season! Duck season! Amtrak season! Amtrak season!?”
If today were truly about protection, I’d hope there wouldn’t be this sort of half-assed approach.
Bottom line, I’m gratified by the nabbing of the bad guys (and I presume that there are dozens of Americans who can quietly take part of the credit here), but sick and tired of the motions we go through. Every grandmother on a puddle-jumper from Keokuk to Podunk today is being forced to throw out her Ensure in the name of terrorism. We go through the kabuki motions to keep ourselves safe — when in reality, these explosives are just too easy to make and too hard to detect to ever be safe from them. You’d think we’d have learned that in 1995.
Protection comes from, hopefully, further reducing the number of people who are willing to do this, from the already-tiny number it’s at now, and just maybe adopting a fatalist attitude. If today’s terrorists had not been caught, five or six planes would have been attacked, with the death of thousands. That’s important to prevent. But even on that day, 20,000 planes would have arrived safely, and millions would have been unaffected. Every one of those millions, today, are being affected, and are being told that they, personally, are in danger from terrorism. And isn’t that exactly what the purpose of terrorism is?
I’m glad you find this all so funny, but your laughter is distracting you from some very large holes in your logic:
First, you seem to be suggesting that the UK’s success in thwarting an actual terrorist plot proves that their methods are effective and justified and that the US’s methods are rhetorical and overblown. This is a false choice. Perhaps they chose to act in the UK because they considered it an easier target than the US? And even if not, the fact that no one’s tried anything in five years doesn’t mean our precautions have been unnecessary. That’s like saying my life insurance premiums to date have been a waste of money because I didn’t die yet. Time, as far as I know, is still unidirectional, and so we must make decisions based on what we know, not what we are going to know.
Second, the number of Iraqis that die every day doesn’t make terrorism less awful. Not even a little bit.
Third, you’re making the current precautions sound ridiculous by only quoting select pieces of them. Baby food and medicine is allowed on the plane, but the passenger needs to taste it first. So, yeah – you can put explosives in your Gerber bottles, but you’re going to have to ingest some before getting on the plane. Also, your point about being able to put the liquids in checked baggage overlooks the fact that checked baggage is screened for explosives before it boards the plane. (Of course, I have no idea how effective or exhaustive these screens are, but they are the rationale for banning liquids on carryons and not checked baggage).
A better argument for allowing toothpaste & Evian on planes is this: they caught those 20 guys in London without screening passenger carryon bags. On the surface, these methods seem much more effective (and less obtrusive) than the current restrictions. Why not expand those methods and leave the rest of us alone?
I only have one comment in regards to Brian’s comments. So what if a SUICIDE bomber has to taste his baby food explosives first? The guy is prepared to blow or burn himself up. Do you really think he cares if he has a tummy ache while he kills himself and everyone on the plane? I’m all for ridding the cabins of all the morons’ clutter anyway. Get rid of carry-ons and be done with it. Then maybe we can use all those double digit IQ screeners currently screening carry on luggage for something a little more useful like searching our checked luggage for a real bomb. If little Timmy can’t last 4 hours on a plane without some friggin Gerbers, then maybe the little turd is too young to fly?
Air travel is never going to be 100% safe. If you can’t handle that, don’t fly. But don’t treat us all like some Koran-rabid fundamentalist to provide some illusion of safety. Jesus, why does everything have to be so safe anyway? Take a damned chance once in a while. Fo more on this, I suggest you check out “Airport Security” which is a great little bit George Carlin wrote well before 9-11.
Why do they let men with big strong hands on an airplane?
You seem to be suggesting that the UK’s success in thwarting an actual terrorist plot proves that their methods are effective and justified and that the US’s methods are rhetorical and overblown.
No, I’m not. I’m saying that the specific lockdown methods on the airports this week were rhetorical and overblown, independent of the success of the UK’s methods. The UK also tackled an unarmed innocent man in the subway and blew his head off, so there’s plenty of blame on both sides. I suspect that both countries have many antiterrorism methods that are nonrhetorical and appropriately, er, blown, but since they lack a certain theater we must also go through the public kabuki dances.
Perhaps they chose to act in the UK because they considered it an easier target than the US?
That would be nice, but it just ain’t so. Our ability to detect liquid explosives is astoundingly inadequate, in part because it’s astoundingly difficult. So much so that I’m uncertain that it’s a good investment to pursue.
Besides, they were targeting American carrier flying between the UK and the US. From the perspective of the number of Americans who might be killed in a successful attack, I doubt it makes much difference where it originates.
the fact that no one’s tried anything in five years doesn’t mean our precautions have been unnecessary. That’s like saying my life insurance premiums to date have been a waste of money because I didn’t die yet.
You make a presumption of efficacy here. Your analogy to life insurance would work much better if you had a policy that may or may not pay off, and only under the proper circumstances — meanwhile, your family is not allowed to know what those circumstances are.
I’m not saying that all of our precautions have been a waste of time and money — just a very large percentage thereof.
Time, as far as I know, is still unidirectional, and so we must make decisions based on what we know, not what we are going to know.
Do you really want to follow this line of argument? You’re talking about a security apparatus that’s stunningly good at ignoring large segments of what we know that happens to be politically inconvenient.
Second, the number of Iraqis that die every day doesn’t make terrorism less awful. Not even a little bit.
Of course not. But don’t you find it the least bit interesting that the possibility of American civilian casualties causes a political firestorm, while the certainty of Iraqi civilian casualties on a similar scale no longer rates first page coverage, even though it’s the direct result of American actions?
I agree that I set up a false correlation. However, it would be nice for Americans to stop acting as if the only life that’s precious is the type of life that speaks English as a first language.
Baby food and medicine is allowed on the plane, but the passenger needs to taste it first. So, yeah – you can put explosives in your Gerber bottles, but you’re going to have to ingest some before getting on the plane.
Dude. I hope you saw the holes in this logic as soon as you wrote it? Build a container with a dual chamber, for example, a thermos. Alternately, just sip the damned explosives. If you’re planning on blowing yourself up in the next half-hour, are you particularly concerned with the tummyache you’ll have tomorrow morning?
your point about being able to put the liquids in checked baggage overlooks the fact that checked baggage is screened for explosives before it boards the plane. (Of course, I have no idea how effective or exhaustive these screens are, but they are the rationale for banning liquids on carryons and not checked baggage).
1) We’ve spent a few billion dollars, but we haven’t yet set up a comprehensive screening system at all airports.
2) Where we do have that system, it’s not as effective as, say, a French poodle.
3) Where we do have an effective system, it can only detect certain kinds of explosives.
In other words, you’re buying into the kabuki. “The rationale for checking baggage,” you think, “is to screen that baggage for explosives. Therefore, they must be protecting me.” Whether it’s true or not is inconsequential, politically, and that’s the whole point of the kabuki.
they caught those 20 guys in London without screening passenger carryon bags. On the surface, these methods seem much more effective (and less obtrusive) than the current restrictions. Why not expand those methods and leave the rest of us alone?
Obviously, there are two answers:
1) they know that any investigation like the one that caught those bastards relies at least a little on luck, so if you want to be really certain, you implement a second layer of security at the airports. Again, Heathrow strikes me as the model of what to do if you’re really serious about it.
2) if they left you alone, you would be less certain about the lengths the administration is going to protect you. When you get inconvenienced, watched, and searched, it makes you feel safer — regardless of whether you are actually safer as a result of all that.
Well, we haven’t had one of these little confabs in a while, now have we?
I’m not saying that all of our precautions have been a waste of time and money — just a very large percentage thereof.
A percentage – agreed. You’re guessing about large. Not saying you’re wrong, just that you’re guessing.
Just sip the damned explosives. If you’re planning on blowing yourself up in the next half-hour, are you particularly concerned with the tummyache you’ll have tomorrow morning?
Excellent point. I assume that sipping explosives would make your stomach explode in the screening line, but that’s probably not (always) the case.
In other words, you’re buying into the kabuki. “The rationale for checking baggage,†you think, “is to screen that baggage for explosives. Therefore, they must be protecting me.†Whether it’s true or not is inconsequential, politically, and that’s the whole point of the kabuki.
Well, no – I didn’t say I bought into it. I just said that’s the rationale. And yeah – I’d rather have the explosives go through the somewhat effective screening process than go through *no* screening process (although there are better alternatives). The real question is why can’t they just do to the carry-on baggage what they’re currently doing to the checked baggage…
2) if they left you alone, you would be less certain about the lengths the administration is going to protect you. When you get inconvenienced, watched, and searched, it makes you feel safer — regardless of whether you are actually safer as a result of all that.
Ah, now here you’ve hit at the heart of it. The goal is not effectiveness, per se, the goal is a show of strength. A signal to the terrorists that they’re being taken seriously. History has shown that terrorists go after predictable, low risk targets. Our airports aren’t foolproof, but they’re higher risk to the terrorists today than they were a week ago. If this makes the terrorists wait a few months before trying (or choose to go after the trains, as you ominously suggest), then the measures have the effect of making the airports safer. Twisted, but true…